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ތާރީޚް: 22 އޭޕްރިލް 2016

މޫސުމަށް އަންނަ ބަދަލުތަކާއި ގުޅިގެން ކުރާ ނޭދެވޭ އަސަރު ކުޑަކުރުމަށް މިދިޔަ އަހަރު ބޭއްވުނު ކޮޕް 21ގައި އެއްބަސްވެވުނު ޕެރިސް އެގްރީމަންޓްގައި ސޮއިކުރެއްވުމަށް ދުނިޔޭގެ ވެރިން އދ.ގެ މައިމަރުކަޒުގައި 22 އޭޕްރިލް 2016ގައި ބައްދަލުކުރިއެވެ. ޕެރިސް އެގްރީމަންޓަކީ ދުނިޔޭގެ ފިނިހޫނުމިނަށް އަންނަ ބަދަލު 2 ޑިގްރީއަށްވުރެ ދަށުގައި ހިފެހެއްޓުމަށްޓަކައި ދުނިޔޭގެ 190 ވުރެ ގިނަ ޤައުމުތަކުން އެކުގައި މަސައްކަތްކުރުމަށް އެއްބަސްވެ އެކުލަވައިލެވުނު އެގްރީމަންޓެކެވެ. މި އެގްރީމަންޓުގައި 120އަށް ގިނަ ޤައުމަކުން ސޮއިކުރި ނަމަވެސް ތަސްދީގުކޮށްފައި ވަރަށް މަދު ޤައުމަކުންނެވެ

މިމަދު ޤައުމުތަކުގެ ތެރޭގައި ދިވެހިރާއްޖެ ހިމެނޭކަމީ މޫސުމަށް އަންނަ ބަދަލުތަކުން ކުރާ ނޭދެވޭ އަސަރުން ރައްކާތެރިވުމަށް ރާއްޖޭއިން ކުރާ މަސައްކަތް އަންގައިދޭ މިސާލެކެވެ. މީގެ އިތުރުން މިއެގްރީމަންޓް އެކުލަވާލުމުގައި ކުދި ޤައުމުތައް ތަމްސީލުކުރާ އެއޯސިސްގެ ޗެއާރގެ ގޮތުން ދިވެހިރާއްޖެއިން ކުރި މަސައްކަތަކީވެސް މޫސުމަށް އަންނަ ބަދަލުތަކުން ކުރާ ނޭދެވޭ އަސަރު ދުނިޔޭގެ ސަމާލުކަމަށްގެނައުމަށް ރާއްޖެއިންކުރާ މަސައްކަތް ދައްކުވައިދޭކަމެކެވެ

މޫސުމަށް އަންނަ ބަދަލުތަކުން ކުރާ އަސަރުތަކުން ރައްކާތެރިވުމަށް ކުރާމާސައްކަތުގައި އެހީވުމަށް ތަރައްޤީވެފައިވާ ޤައުމުތަކުން 2020 ވަނަ އަހަރާއި ހަމައަށް ކޮންމެ އަހަރަކު 100 ބިލިއަން ޑޮލަޑު ދިނުމަށް ނިންމާފައިވާ އިރު، ޕެރިސް އެގްރިމަންޓަކީ މިނިންމި އަދަދުތައް ދިނުމަށާއި އަދި އެފައިސާ ލިބޭ ޤައުމުތަކުން ރަނގަޅުގޮތުގައި ޚަރަދުކުރުމަށް ބާރުއަޅައިދޭނެ އެގްރިމަންޓެކެވެ. ސަބަބަކީ ޕެރިސް އެގްރިމަންޓަކީ މީގެ ކުރިން އެކުލަވާލި މިފަދަ އެގްރީމަންޓްތަކާއި ޚިލާފަށް ޤާނޫނީ ބާރުލިބިފައިވާ އެގްރީމަންޓަކަށްވުމެވެ. އެހެންކަމުން ދުނިޔޭގެ ފިނިހޫނުމިން 2 ޑިގްރީއަށް ވުރެ މަށްޗަށް ދިޔަ ނުދީ ހިފެހެއްޓުމަށް ޤައުމުތަކުން ކުރާ މަސައްކަތާއި ޚަރަދުތަކާމެދު މިއެގްރީމަންޓްގެ ދަށުން ޖަވާބުދާރީ ވާންޖެހެއެވެ

މޫސުމަށް އަންނަ ބަދަލުތަކުން ކުރާ ނޭދެވޭ އަސަރުތަކުން ރައްކާތެރިވުމުގެ ހަރަކާތުގެ އެންމެ ކުރީ ސަފުގައި ހިމެނޭ ދިވެހިރާއްޖެ އަކީ އެ ބަދަލުތަކުގެ ސަބަބުން އެންމެ ބޮޑު ގެއްލުމެއް ލިބޭނެ އެއް ގައުމެވެ. އަދި މިއަސަރުތަކުން ރައްކާތެރިވުމަށްޓަކައި ބައިނަލްއަޤުވާމީ އެކިފަރާތްތަކުން، ލޯނާއި އެހީގެ ގޮތުގައި ގިނަ އަދަދެއްގެ ފައިސާ ލިބޭ އެއްޤައުމެވެ. 2011 އާއި 2013 އާއި ދެމެދު ދިވެހިރާއްޖެއިން ވަނީ މޫސުމަށް އަންނަ ބަދަލުތަކުގެ ނޭދެވޭ އަސަރުތަށް ކުޑަކުރުމާއި ތައްޔާރުވުމުގެ އެކި ކަންކަމަށް ދައުލަތުގެ ބަޖެޓުން 2.87 މިލިއަން ޑޮލަރު ޚަރަދުކޮށްފައެވެ. އަދި 2011 އިން 2017 އާއި ދެމެދު މިފަދަ އެހެނިހެން ހަރަކާތްތަކަށް ބޭރުގެ ފަރާތްތަކުން ލިބޭ އެހީ އާއި ލޯނުގެ ޒަރިއްޔާއިން 168.17 މިލިއަން ޑޮލަރު އިތުރަށް ހަރަދުކުރުމަށް ވަނީ ކަނޑައަޅާފައިއެވެ. އަދި މީގެ އިތުރުން ގްރީން ކްލައިމެޓް ފަންޑުން، ރައްކާތެރި ސާފުބޯފެން ފޯރުކޮށްދިނުމަށްޓަކައި 23 މިލިއަން ޑޮލަރުގެ އެހީ ވަނީ ލިބިފައެވެ. އަދި މިދިޔަ އަހަރު ޕެރިހުގައި ބޭއްވުނު ކޮޕް 21ގެ ހަވާސާ ހަރަކާތެއްގައި މޫސުމީ ބަދަލުން ދިވެހިރާއްޖެއަށް ކުރާ އަސަރުތަކުން ރައްކާތެރިވުމަށް 3.4 މިލިއަން ޑޮލަރު ދިނުމަށް އިޓަލީއިން ވަނީ ނިންމާފައެވެ. މިހާ ގިނަ އަދަދެއްގެ ފައިސާ ލިބިފައިވީހިނދު، މި ފައިސާ، އޭގެ އަސްލު ބޭނުމަށް ޚަރަދުކުރެވޭކަން ރައްޔިތުންނަށް އަންގައިދިނުމުގެ އިތުރުން، މި ފައިސާތައް ޚަރަދު ކުރުމުގައި ނަޒާހާތްތެރިކަމާއި ހާމަކަން ބޮޑު ސިޔާސަތަކެއް ގެންގުޅުމަކީ ޚަރަދުތައް ހިންގުމުގެ އޮނިގަނޑުމެދު ރައްޔިތުންގެ އިތުބާރު ބޮޑުވެ، ކުރާ މަސައްކަތުގައި ރައްޔިތުންގެ އެއްބާރުލުން ލިބިގެންދާނެ ކަމެކެވެ

ނަމަވެސް ހިތާމަޔާއި އެކު ފާހަގަކޮށްލަންޖެހޭކަމަކީ ރާއްޖޭގައި މިފަދަ ޚަރަދުތައް ހިންގުމުގެ އޮނިގަނޑުމެދު ސުވާލު އުފައްދަން ޖާގަ ލިބޭފަދަ ދަނޑިވަޅުތައް ވަރަށް އާންމުކޮށް ފެންނަމުންދާކަމެވެ. މީގެ އެންމެ ބޮޑު އެއް މިސާލަކީ 2014 ވަނައަހަރު މާލެއަށް ކުރިމަތިވި ފެނުގެ ދަތިކަން ނުވަތަ ’ވޯޓާ ކްރައިސިސް‘ އެވެ. 9 ދުވަސްވަންދެން ރާއްޖޭގެ އާބާދީގެ 1/3 ފެނަށްޖެހިފައިތިބެންޖެހުނު މިހާދިސާއަށްފަހު، މިހާދިސާއިން ލިބުނު ގެއްލުންތަކުން އަރައިގަތުމަށްޓަކައި 20 މިލިއަން ޑޮލަރު ބޭނުންވާކަމަށް ސަރުކާރުން ހާމަކުރިއެވެ. އަދި އާންމުންގެ ފަރާތުން މިފައިސާ ހޯދުމަށްޓަކައި އެހީއަށް (ޑޮނޭޝަންއަށް) އެދި ހުޅުވާލިއެވެ. މިހާދިސާއަށް 1 އަހަރަށްވުރެ ގިނަ ދުވަސްވެފައިވާއިރު، މިއަދާހަމައަށްވެސް މިދެންނެވުނު ބޮޑު އަދަދު އައީ ކިހިނެއް ކަމާއި މިހާތަނަށް މީގެތެރެއިން ލިބިފައިވަނީ ކިހާފައިސާއެއްކަން އަދި މިއީ ކޮންކަމަކަށް ޚަރަދުކުރަންކަން ހޯދި ފައިސާއެއްކަންވެސް ސާފުކޮށްދެވިފައެއްނުވެއެވެ. ރާއްޖޭގެ ތާރީޚުގައި ދުށް އެންމެ ބޮޑެތި ޚިޔާނާތާއި ކޮރަޕްޝަންގެ މައްސަލަތައް ފެންމަތިވެފައިވާ މިފަދަ ދަނޑިވަޅެއްގައި ކަންބޮޑުވުން އިތުރުކުރުވާ ކަމަކީ ރައްޔިތުންނަށް އެހީވުމަށް ދެވޭ ފައިސާއަށް ޚިޔާނާތްތެރިވާ ފަރާތްތަކުގެ މައްޗަށް ޝަރީއަތް ނުހިންގޭކަމެވެ. މީގެ އެއްހެއްކަކީ 2004 ވަނަ އަހަރު އައި ސުނާމީގެ ގެއްލުމުން އަރައިގަތުމަށްޓަކައި ރާއްޖެއަށް ލިބުނު އެހީގެ ފައސާގެތެރެއިން 1.6 މިލިއަން ޑޮލަރަށް ޚިޔާނާތްތެރިވި ފަރާތްތައްވެސް އެއްވެސްކަހަލަ ޝަރީޢަތެއް ނުކުރެވި މިނިވަންކަމާއި އެކު ސަރުކާރުގެ މަތީ ފެންވަރުގެ މަޤާމުތަކުގައި ތިބުމެވެ

ޤައުމުގެ ޙާލަތު މިހެން އޮތުމުގެ ސަބަބުން މިއަހަރުގެ އާރތު ޑޭ (22 އޭޕްރިލް) އާއި ދިމާކޮށް ސޮއިކުރެވުނު އެގްރީމަންޓުންވެސް މޫސުމަށް އަންނަ ބަދަލުން އެންމެ ބޮޑަށް އަސަރުކުރުވާފައިވާ އަދި އަސަރުކުރާނެ އާންމު ރައްޔިތުންނަށް އެދެވޭ ބަދަލެއް ލިބިދާނެކަމާމެދު ސުވާލު އުފެދެއެވެ. އެހެންކަމުން، މާޒީގައި ކަންހިނގާފައިވާ ގޮތުން އިބުރަތް ހާސިލުކޮށްގެން ރައްޔިތުންގެ އިތުބާރު ލިބޭފަދަ ގޮތަކަށް މޫސުމަށް އަންނަ ބަދަލުތަކުން ރައްކާތެރިވުމަށް ރާއްޖެއަށް ލިބޭފައިސާ ޚަރަދު ކުރުމަށް ސަރުކާރަށް ގޮވާލަމެވެ. މިގޮތުން، ފައިސާ ޚަރަދު ކުރުމުގަޔާއި ޕްރޮޖެކްޓްތައް ހިންގުމުގައި ތިރީގައިވާ ކަންކަމަށް އިސްކަން ދިނުމަށް މިޖަމްޢިއްޔާއިން އިލްތިމާސްކޮށް ގޮވާލަމެވެ

އަމިއްލައަށް އިސްނަގައިގެން މަޢުލޫމާތު ހާމަކުރުން

2013 ވަނަ އަހަރު ޓްރާންސްޕޭރެންސީ މޯލްޑިވްސް އިން ކުރިއަށް ގެންގޮސްފައިވާ، މޫސުމަށް އަންނަ ބަދަލުތަކާ ގުޅިގެން ރާއްޖޭގައި ކުރެވޭ ޚަރަދުތައް ހިންގުމުގެ އޮނިގަނޑާބެހޭ ދިރާސާ (ކްލައިމެޓް ފައިނޭންސް ގަވަރނެންސް އެސެސްމެންޓް)ގައި ފާހަގަ ކޮށްފައިވާ އެއް މައްސަލައަކީ، މޫސުމަށް އަންނަ ބަދަލުތަކާ ގުޅިގެން ހިންގޭ މަޝްރޫއު ތަކާ ބެހޭ މަޢުލޫމާތު އެއްތާކަށް އެއްކުރެވި، ފަސޭހައިން ލިބޭނެ ގޮތެއް ނެތުމެވެ. މަޝްރޫތައް ހިންގެނީ ކޮން ތަނެއްގައި، ކޮން ބޭނުމަކަށް އަދި ކޮން ފަރާތަކުން ފައިސާދީގެންކަން އިނގޭނެ މައި ޑޭޓާބޭސްއެއް އެކުލަވާލެވިފައި އެއް ނުވުމެވެ. މިގޮތަށް މި މަޢުލޫމާތު ލިބެން ނެތުމުގެ ސަބަބުން މޫސުމަށް އަންނަ ބަދަލުތަކާ ގުޅިގެން ކުރާ ޚަރަދުތައް ކުރަނީ އެންމެ އެކަށީގެންވާ ގޮތުގައިތޯ ބަލާ މޮނިޓަރ ކުރުމަށް މަދަނީ މުޖުތަމަޢުއަށާއި އާއްމުންނަށް އުނދަގޫވެއެވެ. 2014 ވަނަ އަހަރު މަޢުލޫމާތު ހޯދާ ލިބިގަތުމާބެހޭ ޤާނޫނު ފާސްވެފައި ވީނަމަވެސް، ކަމާ ގުޅުން ހުރި އިދާރާތަކުން އަމިއްލަ އިސްނެގުމަށް މިފަދަ މަޢުލޫމާތު އާންމު ނުކުރުމުގެ ސަބަބުންނާއި، އެފަރާތްތަކުން މަޢުލޫމާތު ހޯދުމުގައި ހުރި އިދާރީ ގޮންޖެހުންތަކުގެ ސަބަބުން މޫސުމަށް އަންނަ ބަދަލުތަކާ ގުޅިގެން ހިންގޭ މަޝްރޫއުތަކާ ބެހޭ މަޢުލޫމާތު ލިބިގަތުމުގައި އަދިވެސް ދަތިތަކެއް އެބަހުއްޓެވެ. އެހެންކަމުން، ރައްޔިތުންނަށް މިކަމުގައި އެކަށީގެންވާ މިންވަރަށް ބައިވެރިވުމަށާއި ފާރަވެރިވުމަށް ހުޅުވާލެވިފައިވާ މާޙައުލެއް ބިމާކުރުމަށްޓަކައި އަމިއްލައަށް އިސްނަގައިގެން މަޢުލޫމާތު ހާމަކުރުމުގެ ސަޤާފަތެއް ގެންގުޅެން ފަށަން އެބަޖެހެއެވެ

ނިންމުންތައް ނިންމުމުގައި ހާމަކަން ބޮޑު ސިޔާސަތެއް ގެންގުޅުން

މޫސުމަށް އަންނަ ބަދަލުތަކާ ގުޅިގެން ރާއްޖޭގައި ކުރެވޭ ޚަރަދުތައް ހިންގުމުގެ އޮނިގަނޑާއިމެދު ދެން އޮތް އެންމެ ބޮޑު ކަންބޮޑުވުމަކީ ކަންކަން ނިންމުމުގައި ހާމަކަން ކުޑަވުމެވެ. މޫސުމަށް އަންނަ ބަދަލުތަކާ ގުޅިގެން ރާއްޖެއަށް ލިބޭ އެހީ އާއި އެހެނިހެން ފައިސާ ޚަރަދު ކުރުމާ ބެހޭ ނިންމުންތައް ނިންމަނީ ރައީސް ޔާމީން އެކުލަވާލައްވާފައިވާ އިކޮނޮމިކް އެންޑް ޔޫތް ކައުންސިލް ފަދަ ސަރުކާރުގެ މަތީ ގުނަވަންތަކުން ކަމުގައި ވީނަމަވެސް، މިގުނަވަންތަކުން ނިންމުންތައް ނިންމަނީ ކިހިނެއްކަން، އަދި އެ ނިންމުންތަކަކީ މިހާރު އަމަލުކުރެވެމުންދާ މޫސުމާ ބެހޭ ސިޔާސަތުތަކާ އެއްގޮތްވާ ނިންމުންތަކެއްކަން ނުވަތަ ނޫންކަން މެދު އެއްވެސް މަޢުލޫމާތެއް ލިބޭކަށް ނުހުރެއެވެ. މީގެ އިތުރުން މޫސުމަށް އަންނަބަދަލުތަކާ ބެހޭގޮތުން ލަފާ ދިނުމަށްޓަކާ އެކި ފަންޑުތަކުގެ ދަށުން އެކި އިދާރާތައް (މިސާލަކަށް ސްކޭލިންގ އަޕް އޮފް ރިނިއުއަބަލް އެނަރޖީ ޕްރޮގްރާމްގެ ފަންނީ އަދި ހިންގާ ކޮމިޓީ) އެކުލަވާލެވިފައި ވީނަމަވެސް، އެ އިދާރާތަކުގެ ދައުރާއި މަސްއޫލިއްޔަތުކުގެ މަޢުލޫމާތު ލިބެނީ ތުންތުން މަތިން އިވޭ ވާހަކަތަކުންނާއި މީޑިއާ ރިޕޯޓްތަކުގެ ޒަރިއްޔާއިން އެކަންޏެވެ. އެހެންކަމުން، އާންމުންގެ އިތުބާރު އިތުރުކުރުމަށާއި މަސްލަހަތު ފުށުއެރުންފަދަ ކަންކަން ނުހިމެނޭކަން ޔަޤީންކޮށްދިނުމަށްޓަކައި ނިންމުންތައް ނިންމުމުގައި ހާމަކަން ބޮޑު ސިޔާސަތެއް ގެންގުޅެއް ޖެހެއެވެ

ރައްޔިތުންގެ ބައިވެރިވުން ފުޅާކުރުން

މޫސުމަށް އަންނަ ބަދަލުތަކާ ގުޅިގެން ކުރެވޭ ޚަރަދުތަށް ކުރެވޭ ގޮތް ބެލުމާއި އެކަމާ ގުޅިގެން ހިންގޭ މަޝްރޫއުތަކުން ކުރާ ފައިދާ ވަޒަންކުރުމުގައި މަދަނީ މުޖުތަމަޢުގެ ދައުރު ވަރަށް މުހިންމެވެ. މި ޖަމްޢިއްޔާތަކަކީ މުޖުތަމަޢުތެރޭގައި، އާންމުންނާ ގުޅިގެން މަޢުލޫމާތު ބަދަލު ކުރުމާއި، ރައްޔިތުންގެ އަޑު އިއްވައިދިނުމުގެ މަސައްކަތްކުރާ އަދި ކުރަންތިބި ފަރާތްތަކެވެ. އެހެންނަމަވެސް މޫސުމާބެހޭ ސިޔާސަތުތަކަށް ނުފޫޒު ފޯރުވުމުގައި ދިވެހިރާއްޖޭގައި، ހާއްސަކޮށް މާލެއާއި ދުރު ހިސާބުތަކުގައި ހަރަކާތްތެރިވާ ޖަމުޢިއްޔާތަކަށް، ލިބިފައިވާ އޮތް ޖާގައާއި ފުރުސަތު ހަނިކަން ފާހަގަކުރެވެއެވެ. އަދި މިފަދަ ޖަމްޢިއްޔާތަކަށް ބޭނުންވާ ގާބިލުކަން އެންމެ އެކަށީގެންވާ މިންވަރުގައި ލިބިދީފައިނުވާއިރު، މިހާރު ކުރިއަށްދާ ސިޔާސަތުތަކާއި މަޝްރޫއުތަކާ ބެހޭ މަޢުލޫމާތުވެސް އެންމެ އެކަށީގެންވާ މިންވަރަށް ލިބިފައިއެއް ނުވެއެވެ. އެހެންނަމަވެސް މޫސުމަށް އަންނަ ބަދަލުތަކަށް އެންމެ ނާޒުކު މުޖުތަމަޢުތަކުގެ ހައްޤުގައި އެންމެ ގާތުން މަސައްކަތްކުރަމުންދާ ބައެއްގެ ހައިސިއްޔަތުން، މިފަދަ ޖަމުޢިއްޔާތަކަށް ރައްޔިތުންގެ އަޑު އުފުލާ، އެމީހުންގެ ކަންބޮޑުވުންތަކާއި ޚިޔާލުތައް މޫސުމާ ބެހޭ ސިޔާސަތުތަކުގައި ހިމެނުމަށް ފުރުސަތު ދިނުމަކީ ނުހަނު މުހިންމު ކަމެކެވެ

ފާރަވެރިވާ އަދި ޖަވާބުދާރީކުރުވަން މަސައްކަތްކުރާ މުއައްސަސާތަކުގެ ޒިންމާއަ ދާކުރަންތަންދިނުމާއި އެޒިންމާތައް ރަނގަޅުގޮތުގައި އުފުލުން

މޫސުމަށް އަންނަ ބަދަލުތަކާ ގުޅިގެން ކުރެވޭ ޚަރަދުތައް ހިންގުމުގައި، ހިންގޭ ކޮރަޕްޝަންގެ އަމަލުތައް ތަހުޤީގުކޮށް މިފަދަ އަމަލުތައް ކުރިމަގުގައި ހިނގިޔަ ނުދިނުމަށް ގެންނަންޖެހޭ އިދާރީ ބަދަލުތަކެއް ގެންނަންޖެހެއެވެ. އެންޓި ކޮރަޕްޝަން ކޮމިޝަން ފަދަ ފާރަވެރިވާ އިދާރާތަކަށް، އެފަރާތްތަކުގެ މަސްއޫލިއްޔަތު އަދާކުރުމަށް ބޭނުންވާ ޤާނޫނީ ބާރުތައް ފުރިހަމައަށް ލިބިދީފައި ނެތުމާއި މިނިވަންކަމާއި އެކު މަސައްކަތްކުރުމުގެ މާހައުލެއް ނެތުމުގެ ސަބަބުން އެފަދަ މުއައްސަސާތަކުގެ މަސްޢޫލިއްޔަތުތައް އަދާކުރުމަށް ދަތިވާކަމަށް ފާހަގަވެއެވެ. އެހެންކަމުން، މިދެންނެވުނު ކަންތައްތައް އިސްލާހުކޮށް ފާރަވެރިވާ އަދި ޖަވާބުދާރީކުރުވަން މަސައްކަތްކުރާ މުއައްސަސާތަކުގެ މަސްޢޫލިއްޔަތު އެންމެ ފުރިހަމަގޮތުގައި އަދާކުރުމުގެ މަގުފަހިވެފައި އޮތުމަކީ ކޮންމެހެން މުހިންމު ކަމެކެވެ. ހަމަ އެއާއިއެކު، ޕެރިސް އެގްރީމަންޓްފަދަ ބައިނަލްއަޤުވާމީ މުއާހަދާތައް މަޖިލީހުން ފާސްކުރުމުގެ އިތުރަށް، ދިވެހި ރައްޔިތުންގެ މަންދޫބުންގެ ހައިސިއްޔަތުން، މަޖިލީސް މެދުވެރިކޮށް މޫސުމަށް އަންނަ ބަދަލުތަކާ ގުޅިގެން ކުރެވޭ ޚަރަދުތައް ހިންގުމުގައި ބައިވެރިވާ ސަރުކާރުގެ އިދާރާތައް ޖަވާބުދާރީ ކުރުވުމުގައި ރައްޔިތުން މަޖިލީހުގެ މެމްބަރުން މިހާރަށްވުރެ ފުޅާކޮށް މަސައްކަތްކުރަންޖެހެއެވެ

ސޮއިކުރެވިގެން މިދިޔަ ތާރީޚީ އެގްރިމަންޓާއިއެކު، ރާއްޖޭގައި މޫސުމަށް އަންނަބަދަލުތަކުން ރައްކާތެރިވުމަށް ލިބޭ ފައިސާ ހިންގުމުގެ އޮނިގަނޑު ރަނގަޅުކުރުމަށް ސަރުކާރުން އިސްނަގައިގެން، ފައިސާދޭ ފަރާތްތަކާއި މަދަނީ ޖަމްޢިއްޔާތަކާ ގުޅިގެން އިތުރު ހިތްވަރަކާއި އެކު މަސައްކަތް ކުރަން ފަށަންޖެހިފައިވާކަމަށް މިޖަމްޢިއްޔާއިން ދެކެމެވެ

ނިމުނީ

Download the governance update here: Governance bulleting April 2016


To President, Cabinet Ministers, Members of the Parliament, Members of constitutional bodies, Members of institutions, and officials of state-owned enterprises:

We write this petition to request you to declare and publicly disclose your assets in order to enhance transparency and integrity of public officials, and to increase public trust in the state and oversight bodies. We believe asset declarations are crucial in ensuring that personal interests of public officials do not conflict with their duties and responsibilities. Asset declarations also help to identify cases of illicit enrichment, so that a public official may legitimately be held accountable. Therefore, we call on you to declare your assets in accordance with the law, and to disclose your assets by publishing on the website of your respective offices.

Call on your public officials to declare and disclose their assets to the public, sign the petition! You can also send this letter to the Parliament requesting them to share the asset declaration on their website.

Why this is important

Asset declaration requires a certain category of public officials––also identified as “politically exposed persons” to describe individuals entrusted with prominent public functions––to disclose their financial and business interests. The principle goal of asset declaration is to combat corruption––in particular, illicit enrichment––and promote transparency and accountability of the governance system.

The Maldivian Constitution requires the President, Cabinet Ministers, Members of the Parliament, and Judges to annually submit their financial and business interests. Members of constitutional bodies such as the Anti-Corruption Commission, Judicial Service Commission and Elections Commission are also required to submit their asset declaration documents. However, there is no legal provision for the following officials to submit their declarations:

  • Vice President
  • Auditor General
  • Information Commissioner
  • Members of other constitutional bodies such as Human Rights Commission of the Maldives and Civil Service Commission
  • Members of institutions such as Maldives Media Council, Maldives Broadcasting Commission, Police Integrity Commission, and Customs Integrity Commission
  • Officials of state-owned enterprises

While this is one key weakness of the current asset declaration regime, other key weaknesses include lack of accountability and lack of transparency.

Despite the constitutional provisions that mandate some public officials to declare their assets, there are no punitive measures legally prescribed to those who violate this provision. This lack of accountability puts these public officials above the law and encourages a culture of impunity to thrive unchecked. While some officials submit the documents regularly, others do not submit at all, thus rendering the system ineffective.

Furthermore, the main objective of asset declaration is to enhance transparency and integrity of public officials and restore the trust of citizens in the government and oversight bodies. The fulfilment of this objective, however, is currently impossible since the declared information is not made available to the public. Public disclosure gives the media, civil society groups, and the wider public an increased role in holding public officials to account.

 

 


Transparency Maldives thanks friendly nations, the Government of the Maldives, local businesses, civil society organisations, and the public for their continued efforts to provide water aid to residents of Malé, in response to  the water crisis following the incident of fire at Malé Water Sewerage Company (MWSC) on 4 December.

In order to avoid further escalation of the social, economic and political repercussions stemming from the water crisis, Transparency Maldives calls on the Government and MWSC to be more transparent in their efforts to provide aid and to overcome the crisis.

The following issues must be addressed by the Government and MWSC (a joint venture company that has 80 per cent government shares and whose board is appointed by the government) in order to be transparent and accountable to the public:

  • The Government must publicly provide a breakdown of the estimated US$20 million (more than MVR300 million) needed to overcome the crisis, and how the government intends to spend it. Furthermore, the decision to seek donations from the public raises questions given that MWSC is a private, profit-making corporation with 80 per cent government shares.

 

  • Transparency Maldives calls on the Government and MWSC to conduct an independent, transparent, and technical investigation into the 4 December fire incident; make the findings public; and establish effective and preventative mechanisms to ensure such incidents do not occur again. The investigation must scrutinise MWSC’s risk mitigation policy and asset management plan.

The current situation demonstrates the interminable relationship between good governance and citizens’ right to essential human needs. Therefore, Transparency Maldives believes that it is the responsibility of the government to hold accountable and to ensure that MWSC and other companies that provide essential services, such as the State Electric Company Limited (STELCO) and FENAKA Corporation  Limited, have mechanisms in place to review their working procedures so that similar incidents can be avoided in the future. These accountability measures must incorporate company boards and relevant state regulatory bodies.

ENDS

For all media queries, please contact Advocacy and Communications Manager, Aiman Rasheed (7908967).

View/download this press statement in Dhivehi and English


The current Associations Act and regulations adversely affects the formation and running of civil society organizations due to the ineffective and bureaucratic system that does not distinguish between foundations, charities, sports clubs, NGO’s, CBO’s and federations and imposes one set of rules on all associations leading to administrative and governance difficulties; a legal framework from 2003 that does not take into account the expansive Bill of Rights enshrined in the Chapter Two of the 2008 Constitution of Maldives 2008; no provisions and systems in the current administrative and legal framework.

Work is underway in reforming the Associations Act in oder to develop and foster an enabling environment for the civil society to flourish.The governance, transparency and functioning of CBO’s will improve if the systemic issues in the regulatory framework are addressed.

Comments and recommendations on 2003 Associations Act addresses several legal issues with the 2003 Associations Act of the Maldives.

Download here


The National Integrity System of the Maldives is based on three compound structures of key institutions: the core government agencies of Legislature, the Executive and theJudiciary the public sector agencies, the Civil Service and Law Enforcement Agencies the Elections Commission and Anti Corruption Commission, Auditor General’s Office the Media and the Civil Society Organisations, Political parties and private sectorBusiness.

The methodology and guiding questions applied for the research are developed by Transparency International and are based on the concept of a strong National Integrity System (NIS) to ensure a sustained and strong control over corruption in all areas of the society. Visit http://goo.gl/eALDRV to learn about the NIS concept.

The conceptual framework of the National Integrity System (NIS) stresses the role and interplay of a broader institutional framework of the State, including ‘anti-corruption agents in government, civil society, the business community and other relevant sectors, in ‘building [the] momentum, political will and civic pressure for relevant reform initiatives’ required to reduce and eliminate corruption in public service. Therefore, in assessing the National Integrity System (NIS) of the Maldives, it is important for the assessment to investigate that process, and the outcome of interplay between institutions. This study draws up conclusions and recommendations with due consideration to that interplay. Recommendations provided in this study should be read reflecting on the factors that affect this interplay and its outcomes.

Political bias created through intermingled political thinking and practices embedded in key political institutions, including the Legislature and the Executive, reduces the capacity of other institutions to function independently. Moreover, political bias embedded in the institutional framework further reduces the level of accountability, transparency and integrity functions of almost all the institutions.

The legal framework, starting with the Constitution that provides and guarantees basic rights of people in the Maldivian society, establishes a notable legislative framework for the good governance of socio-economic activities. However, the broader legal framework lacks adequate organisational structures and capabilities, and this weakens the adaptive efficiency of that legal framework to practically execute institutional tasks in the most effective manner. Further, this institutional weakness lies with weak historical institutions or traditionally transmitted historical undemocratic constitutional rules that are embedded in the current political system. The Maldives only created a democratic political system after the enactment of its first-ever democratic Constitution in 2008. Prior to that, the Maldives followed a Constitution that was built on pre-1965 monarchical practices, and encompassed a Constitutional Government with weak political institutions, vesting excessive powers in the rulers or policy-makers. Although the Constitution of 2008 created a democratic Constitutional Government, the traditionally transmitted undemocratic political practices are also embedded in the new politico-institutional framework, thus weakening the overall institutional framework, and leaving room for mis-governance and political malpractices. Hence, the political and legal institutions in place to govern the society are also weakened, reducing their capacity to create and uphold national integrity.

View/download our press statement on NIS in Dhivehi.
View/download the National Integrity System Assessment, Maldives 2014

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National Integrity System Assessment, Maldives 2014


Transparency Maldives’ (TM) survey, Democracy at the Crossroads, points to a crisis of public confidence in key democratic institutions. Citizens are cynical. Politicians, they think, lie to get elected and they don’t believe that the government cares about ordinary people.
The nationwide survey aims to encourage informed debate of democratic norms and about the performance of democratic institutions.
“This [the survey] shows that citizens are less likely to meaningfully participate in public matters and in holding public officials accountable. If so, it will ultimately lead to impunity and corruption,” Mariyam Shiuna, Executive Director of TM said.

Crisis of confidence

Citizens lack confidence in their key representative institutions. 62% of survey respondents say they have no confidence at all in the parliament. And 58% have no confidence in political parties. 50% and 46% citizens lack confidence in local governments and courts respectively. These results are similar to TM’s Global Corruption Barometer surveys from 2012 and 2013.
77% of Maldivians identify “politics,” which includes conflict, corruption and the party system, as the most important problem facing the country. Half of the public is dissatisfied with the way democracy operates in the Maldives.
Maldivians give political leaders a low rating. None rate better than average.

Cynicism, democratic values and social order

86% of Maldivians say that the government does not care about ordinary people and 92% of Maldivians believe that politicians are “ready to lie to get elected”, showing extraordinarily high levels of cynicism in comparison to similar transitional democracies.
Citizens are critical of the social order: 84% think that power is concentrated in the hands of too few people.  The good news is that 90% of the public believe dialogue is the way to solve the country’s problems. The bad news is that 1 in 3 think that violence is sometimes a necessary response to social injustice.
Maldivians are not enthusiastic about gender equality. A majority think men make better leaders than women. Remarkably, more women than men support the idea that men make better leaders than women.

Is there hope?

“Democratic institutions must take extraordinary measures to regain the trust of the public and the public must step up to hold public officials to account,” said Aiman Rasheed, Advocacy and Communications Manager. “Levels of confidence in institutions is a key indicator of the levels of corruption in a system,” he added.
This is the first systematic survey on democracy conducted in the Maldives and provides important benchmark data. The random sample of approximately 1,000 citizens provides a margin of error of +/- 3.0% and the findings are generalisable to the entire country. The questions asked come from surveys that have been repeatedly used and tested around the world.
ENDS
For all media queries, please contact Advocacy and Communications Manager, Aiman Rasheed (00 960 7908967).

Click to view/download the report ‘Democracy at the Crossroads’ 

Click to view/download this statement in Dhivehi
Click to view/download this statement in English


PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
MALE — (23 March 2014) — Transparency Maldives (TM) appreciates and thanks all observers and volunteers in our observer network, based in 20 atolls and Colombo and Kuala Lumpur. The observers were key to the success of the observation. TM hopes that an independent observation effort at this scale has instilled greater levels of trust  in our electoral processes. The results we report are based on random sampling and are generalisable to the entire country.

1. Polling day
The election day processes were transparent and generally well-administered. We are happy to report that the election has been peaceful with just one reported incident of violence inside a polling station. TM congratulates Maldivian citizens for their spirited engagement in the democratic process.

The following are the key findings which we would like to highlight from our observation. 83.52% of polling stations closed within the first hour of the normal closing time of 4:00 p.m.

Voter registry was overall very clean, with a very few cases where people were not able to vote because their names were not on the voter registry or their details did not match. Assisted voters were spread across 84.1% of the polling stations.

Voting was temporarily halted in 2.4% of polling stations. 75% of these cases were interventions at the direction of the Presiding Officer while 25% were interventions by an unruly voter.

We note that the police entered 12.35% of polling stations. However, in 100% of such cases, interventions occurred at the invitation of the Presiding Officer as the rules allow.

Candidates were well-represented during the counting, making the process transparent and adding to its credibility. Maldivian Democratic Party was represented at 89.4% of polling stations during the vote count. Coalition parties were represented at 88.8% of polling stations during the vote count. Only 5.9% of polling stations did not have a party/candidate observer present at the opening of the polls.

Unresolved disputes were reported at only 5.3% ballot boxes at the time of announcing results.

However, TM calls on all actors to take immediate measures to address wider issues, including vote buying, lack of transparency in political finance, abuse of state resources, barriers for women’s equal participation in the electoral processes, and bring long overdue reforms to the electoral legal framework.

2. Vote buying
In a survey conducted by TM in the run up to 2013 presidential elections, 15% of respondents reported that money or other incentives were offered in exchange for their vote. Admissions about illegal activities such as this are usually underreported in surveys. TM’s long-term observation indicates that vote buying may be even more widespread in the parliamentary elections than other elections.

Inability of state institutions to prosecute vote buying due to gaps in the electoral legal framework, lack of coordination, and buck-passing between the relevant institutions have allowed rampant vote buying to go unchecked.

TM recommends to all relevant institutions to monitor, investigate and prosecute vote buying through implementation of the existing legal provisions and recommends to the Parliament to bring urgent reforms to the laws to better address the issue.

3. Lack of Political and Campaign Finance Transparency
Deep flaws in the standards, practices and poor oversight have led to the lack of transparency in political and campaign financing in elections, including the parliamentary elections. When political parties and individual candidates do not fully disclose where they get their money from, it is not clear who funds them, what their potential conflict of interests are, and, thereby allows vested interests to override public interest when elected as MPs.  Similarly, Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer surveys for the Maldives continue to indicate a crisis of public trust in the Parliament. Increasing campaign financing transparency in parliamentary elections is crucial to hold parliamentarians to account, in order to prevent the hijack of the institution by vested interests and regain public trust in the Parliament .

TM recommends addressing the gaps in the electoral legal framework and implementation of existing provisions to facilitate public scrutiny, ensure periodic reporting and an effective oversight mechanism for political finance.

4. Women Political Participation
Only 23 women out of 302 candidates contested the Parliamentary Elections, out of which only five were elected according to the provisional results. The Maldives is currently ranked 129th place in the Inter-Parliamentary Union’s index of parliaments in terms of gender balance. Relevant authorities should identify and address the barriers for women’s equal political participation.

5. Other Issues
Additional issues that need to be addressed are:

  1. Abuse of state resources and authority by successive regimes, allowing those in power to campaign at the expense of the public purse;
  2. Constituency delineation legal framework and processes that result in assignation of voters to constituencies not based on their domiciled residencies, robbing voters of effective representation;
  3. Instances where secrecy of the ballot  may be compromised when a few people are registered to outside their constituencies (for example, 2,947 cases of single voters; 1,070 cases of two voters; and, 502 cases of three voters);
  4. Lack of effective  long-term voter and civic education on issues such as vote buying, political finance transparency and equality of women in political participation; and,
  5. Uncertainties arising from the role of the judiciary in elections and, in particular, the 16-point guideline issued by the Supreme Court. TM reiterates that the guideline does  not improve upon the technical aspects of the election and recommends that any concerns the guideline intends to tackle be addressed through legislative reforms and within constitutional boundaries.

Transparency Maldives congratulates all winning candidates and urges all relevant actors to reform the electoral systems to increase confidence in and improve electoral systems in the Maldives. A final report on the findings with recommendations will be published within a month of conclusion of elections.

ENDS

For media queries, please contact Advocacy and Communications Manager, Aiman Rasheed on 00 960 790 8967.

Click to view/download this statement in English
Click to view/download this statement in Dhivehi


PRESS RELEASE 

Male – (22 March 2014) –Transparency Maldives thanks our observers deployed across the country for their dedication in observing the election processes. Transparency Maldives’ observer network has a wide national coverage spanning resorts, prisons, and abroad in Kuala Lumpur and Colombo.

The results we report are based on random sampling and are generalisable to the entire country. These results are based on the observation at the time of opening of polls.

The opening of the polls was smooth, and the administrative preparation went well. 79% of all polling stations opened by 8.10am, 20% of polling stations opened within the first hour of the required opening time, and 1% of polling stations opened between 9am and 10am.

Nearly all polling station officials were in place at all polling stations.

The materials required for voting were present and the ballot papers were counted at 100% of the polling stations. 100% of ballot boxes were verified as empty at the opening of the polls.

Candidates were well represented at polling stations. Only 10% of the polling stations did not have a party/candidate observer present at the opening of the polls. Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) observers were present at 78% of polling stations while 81% of polling stations had observers from the coalition parties, at the opening of the polls.

Transparency Maldives also notes that police presence was visible at 93% of the observed polling stations at the time of opening.

Observers concluded that the polling stations were set up to ensure a secret vote in 98% of polling stations. Transparency Maldives observers will be closely monitoring the 2% of the polling station where the secrecy of the ballot may be compromised due to the layout of the polling station.

We encourage all parties to maintain the climate of peace. Our observers are working hard at polling stations and will be present at the polling stations until the polls are closed and the results are announced.

ENDS

For all media queries, please contact Advocacy and Communications Manager, Aiman Rasheed (00 960 7908967)

Click to view/download this statement in English
Click to view/download this statement in Dhivehi


Article 4 of the Constitution of the Maldives stipulates that all the powers of the State of the Maldives are derived from the citizens and remain with the citizens. The power to elect representatives through elections ensure that the powers of the state do remain with the citizens. Direct and elected representatives at island and community level will help improve local governance and the democratic system.

The purpose of this position paper is to bring to the attention of the public and relevant institutions some of the major systemic issues within the electoral framework and advocate for changes to the system.

This paper highlights critical and fundamental issues in the local governance and council election systems. Transparency Maldives hopes that this paper creates discussion on these issues and paves way for the implementation of the recommendations to strengthen the local governance and council election systems.

Click to view/download full position paper in English

Click to view/download full position paper in Dhivehi


9 and 12 January 2013

The National Advisory Committee (NAC) for Elections for the Local Council Elections was first convened on 9 January 2014 with a subsequent meeting held on 12 January 2014.

Updates by the Elections Commission
  • For the first time in Maldives, the voter registry will include photos of voters to ensure easier identification of the voter.
  • Deadline for candidates and parties to sign copies of photo voter registry concluded on 11 January. All political parties except PPM have signed all the lists.
  • Training of polling officials are currently underway in the islands.
  • Elections Commission is facing difficulties in carrying out activities due to budgetary constraints.
Other Points of Note
  • The Elections Commission informed the NAC that the Supreme Court guidelines are an impediment to proper conduction of the elections. Issues such as the requirement for all candidates to sign the voter lists before being dispatched are issues that remain unresolved. As it stands, the Elections Commission will be sending out ballot papers to the islands without the signature of some of the candidates or their representatives.
  • Two cases regarding candidacy currently underway at Supreme Court may affect the election being conducted on 18 January.
About the National Advisory Committee for Elections

The National Advisory Committee for Elections is convened by the Elections Commission and is the highest statutory advisory body for elections. The committee comprises the five members of the Elections Commission, a representative of each political party fielding candidates, a member of the Maldives Broadcasting Commission, Maldives Media Council and the Human Rights Commission of the Maldives, a representative of the Maldives Police Service, civil society and the Department of National Registration.

Transparency Maldives’ (TM) Advocacy and Communications Manager, Aiman Rasheed sits on the National Advisory Committee for Elections as the civil society representative.


Clarification on the reported numbers of the ‘An Assessment on Climate Finance Governance’ report:

 

Maldives has been pledged USD 130 million from 2008 through 2015 for environment and climate change related projects. Some projects financed through the USD 130 million have been concluded while others are currently ongoing. The figure is not MVR 130 billion as reported by some news sources.

 

We apologize for the misinformation.

 

‘An Assessment on Climate Finance Governance’ is a research conducted in 6 countries by Climate Finance Integrity Project’s by the respective Transparency International chapters.

 

This assessment is based on expert interviews and mapping on how funds have been received and utilized. We highlight the main findings and recommendations of the assessment on climate finance governance in Maldives.

 

See the following link for a summary of the report in Dhivehi and the complete report can be found in English at this link.